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If you are an expert, you believe 
that you are in possession of the truth, 
and since you know so much, you are 
unwilling to make allowances for 
unforeseen developments. 
Leo Szilard. "Reminiscences" in 
Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn (Eds.) 
l?w M s l i e c t u a l  Mrpratwn. 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1868. 
THE CULTURAL CONsrRUCIION OF NATURE 
AND 
THE NATURAL D ~ ~ O N  OF CULTURE 
Michael Thompson 
J N T m D U r n O N  
To say that ideas of nature are socially shaped is not to say they can be 
anything a t  all. Yet this is the relativist charge that  is often levelled a t  those 
(for example, the strong programme in the sociology of science and the  
grid/group approach to the sociology of perception) who make it their busi- 
ness to unravel these knowledge-shaping processes. "Okay, go and jump in 
front of that train" say the relativity-rejectors, believing themselves to have 
produced some sort of refutation when the relativist declines the challenge. 
But, of course, no one is saying that valid knowledge is completely fluid; only 
that i t  is not completely solid. Rather, ideas of nature are plastic; they can be 
squeezed into many different configurations but, a t  the same time, there are 
some limits. The idea of nature that would have us leaping in front of trains 
is. I suspect, outside of these l i m i t s i t  is not a socially viable idea of nature. 
The universalist versus relativist debate is a pernicious trivialization of a 
serious issue and the time is long overdue for its replacement by a notion- 
cortstmined mlativism--that firmly rejects both these polarized extremes. 
The problem, of course, lies not in saying this but in providing the concepts 
and the theory to go w i t h  it--concepts and theory strong enough and useable 
enough to avert the dreary decay of the debate to the jumpin-front-of-that- 
train level. This can be done by bringing together insights from two widely 
separated areas of inquiry: the sociology of perception (in which viable ideas 
of haturn are traced back to the different sets of moral justifications neces- 
sary for the maintenance of a small number of distinct types of social organi- 
sation) and the ecology of natural resources (in which a small number of 
myths of nature are deduced from the observed behaviour of different kinds of 
social institutions that strive to manage these complex and only partly under- 
stood systems). 
CONTRADICTORY ~~S AND THE DEERNING SPECTATOR 
What is a resource? I was once fortunate enough to be spectator to an 
exchange of views on this question between a distinguished ecologist and a 
Nobel Prize-winning physicist. The ecologist let drop something about 
"natural resources" and the physicist was down on him like a ton of bricks. 
"You cannot talk about natural resources," he cried, "there are only raw 
materials" and he went on to explain how a raw material only becomes a 
resource when human ingenuity, skill and enterprise are successfully focused 
upon it. 
This is a profound disagreement. For our ecologist riches are given to us 
by nature; for our physicist* they are given to us by culture-by that complex 
whole that gets transferred from one generation to  the next by mechanisms 
that are not genetic; a whole that includes the whole of language, the whole of 
knowledge, the  whole of technology, and a great deal more besides. 
Clearly, our ecologist and our physicist locate resources very differently. 
Their premises, in other words, are different and, as a result, so are the sorts 
of policies that they see as desirable (or even feasible). Our ecologist has an 
idea of nature as something stern and unforgiving--as supplying him with a 
strictly accountable inventory of resources. Our physicist, on the other hand, 
sees these limitations as being of little consequence because they are capable 
of modification, exploitation and multiplication through the application of 
skills that  are culturally acquired and transmitted. In this way he is led to the 
idea of nature as essentially c o m c o p i a n .  So here is a fundamental disagree- 
men t between experts. Our physicist's world is a world of resource abundance; 
our ecologist's one of resource depletion.** 
When people argue from different premises they will, in all probability, 
fail to agree. At best, they may agree to differ. This is something of a d isap 
pointment to those bystanders who want to know the answer, but the discern- 
ing spectator (the individual whose viewpoint I am urging we should adopt) is 
not one of those. His attention is focused not on the  facts of the matter but on 
the facts of the disagreement. He is not looking for the single truth "out 
there" but at the various convictions "in here". For him what is being argued 
about is a foreground distraction and, disregarding this, he zeroes in on what 
really interests him--the premises and their differences. "Where do these 
premises come Erom?", "How many kinds of premises are possible?" ... "What 
leads this individual to this premise and that individual to that premise?" 
These are the sorts of questions that the discerning spectator asks, not "Who 
is right?" 
In other words, the discerning spectator begins by granting legitimacy to 
all these sets of contradictory premises. Nor does the fact that they are con- 
tradictory cause him any dismay. On the contrary, he sees social life as a pro- 
cess that depends for its very existence on the perpetual contention between 
these different sets of convictions about how the world is. 
*I say "our" ecologist and "oui  physicist because I do not wish to imply that each is typical of his 
profession. It may well be that more physicists think like our physicist than do ecalogists (and vice 
vrrso) but, as I will explain later, the reasons for this are to be sought in the way their respective 
disciplines are organised and not in the disciplines themselves. 
**But not because one is a physicist and the other a ecologist. Rather because of differences 
between the ways in which they find themselves incorporated into the social organisation of their 
respective disciplines. 
THE CULTURAL HYPUlTlESS 
When we look at  our environment we do not see it with the naked eye. We 
see it as i t  is filtered through a cultural screeen--our idea of nature. From 
this there follows a very minimal definition of human rationality:. an act  is 
rational if i t  is consistent with the actor's idea of nature. The only trouble 
with this definition is that  it would seem to insist that  e v e r y  act is rational. 
No matter how bizarre an act may be we have only t o  dream up and ascribe to 
the actor a correspondingly bizarre set OF beliefs about how the world is for 
that act to  become rational.** But this descent into complete relativism would 
be unevitable only if, first, there were no social constraints on the beliefs peo- 
ple could adhere to  and, second, there were no chance of nature herself point- 
ing out, from time to time, the inadequacies of some of those beliefs. If we 
allow for the elristence of these two sorts of constraints then. instead of com- 
plete relativism, we obtain a s y s t e m  of constrained r e l a t i u i s m a  system that 
enables us to avoid the dissipative nihilism of the relativist position without a t  
the same time succumbing to the narrow tyranny of the universalist position. 
THE SOCLAL CONSTRANTS 
The cultural hypothesis holds that beliefs, though varied, are not free to 
float about just anywhere. They are closely tied to the social situations that 
they help sustain and render meaningful. If the number of kinds of social 
situations that are possible is limited (and the hypothesis claims that it is) 
then so too will the variation of belief be limited to  a quite small number of 
distinctive patterns or c d t u r a l  biases. If ideas of nature have to pass the test 
of social viability then the weeding out of the non-viable ideas will leave us 
with a multiplicity, but not an infinitude, of mutually contradictory ideas each 
one of which will be associated, through a process of mutual reinforcement, 
with a distinctive patterning of social relations. 
The whole retreat from rationality, which might appear to be relativism's 
inevitable accompaniment, can be averted if we say that  metaphysical beliefs 
are embedded in culture, and that culture is not some deadweight of habits 
that is passed on unchanged from generation to generation, but a lively and 
responsive thing that  is continually being negotiated and renegotiated in 
order to sustain and justify preferred patterns of social relationships. It is the 
udaptive propensity of this negotiating process, coupled with the adoptive cri- 
teria of the social environment in which it takes place, that  gives rise to the 
first dynamic component of the system--the cultural construction OF nature. 
*Human, not becauae animals and plants are not rational, but because they do not have (much) 
culture. 
**rake, for instance, one of the well-known 'gambler's fallacies'. 
If some people believe that af'ter e long run of heeds the probability of tails on the next toas 
mll be greater than 1/2 then one possibility is that they should be interpreted as believing 
thereby in a spirit of distributive justice that regulates the whole cosmos with a policy that 
ensures e v e r - i n m e w  probabilities of a trend-reversing intervention whenever identical 
outcomes begin to succeed one another within an otherwise chance set-up ... a gambler's 
metaphysical belief may be a fault but not the rationality of his reasoning from it. [lohathen 
L. Cohen (1881) 'Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?' Ihs bohviourd 
and b& schwas, 4, pp. 317-70. 
THE NATURAL CONSTRATNTS 
That Doctor Johnston was able to refute Bishop Berkeley by kicking a 
stone should remind us that nature herself can sometimes provide negative 
feedback to curb the wilder excesses of the relativistic urge. But this sort of 
feedback does not always get through. In a social setting where everyone sub- 
scribes to the same idea of nature there will be no sceptic around to deli- 
berately kick the stone. Of course, if the natural constraint is there, people 
will sometimes kick stones by accident but it is wonderful what we can collec- 
tively manage not to  see. 
An idea of nature furnishes us with a way of seeing the world and, more 
importantly, with a way of not seeing the wor ld i t  actually filters out most of 
the negative feedback.' This means that, only when the cumulative costs of 
maintaining that  idea have built up into an intolerable burden, will the nega- 
tive feedback finally force its way through the cultural filter and be noticed. 
When this happens we suffer surprise. In much the same way that the only 
lasting laws of nature are negative (cannot do) laws, so no event is absolutely 
surprising. I t  is only surprising if, first, it  is contradictory in relation to a par- 
ticular idea of nature and, second, it is noticed. Then, and only then, will a 
socially desirable element of belief come into direct conflict with an implaca- 
ble nature. This-the natural destruction of culture-is the second dynamic 
component that completes the system. 
I should hasten to add that, in describing these two components, 1 claim 
no originality. Only in the manner in which I hape to bring them together 
within the context of policy analysis would I venture some presumption. To 
bring together these two components-the cultural construction of nature and 
the natural destruction of culture-] will have to effect some synthesis 
between two promising but new, and academically rather distant, fields-the 
sociology of percepfion, that  has been developed largely by anthropologists, 
and the literature on coping with surprise, that has been inspired by theoreti- 
cal ecology. But before I do that I should briefly repeat my argument in the 
language and context of policy analysis. 
THE RETREAT FROM R A T I O N U  
Let me begin by contrasting the notions of rationality that are built into 
two approaches to policy analysis: classic decision theory and what, for want 
of a better label. I will call historicd contingency theory. 
I take as an exemplar of the first approach Myron Tribus' standard text 
Rational descriptions, decisions and designs. ** 
To develop criteria for ... decisions we need to  define what we mean 
by r a t i o n d .  We shall say that a person who knowingly makes a deci- 
sion which is aganst his own stated objectives is behaving irration- 
ally. That is, if a man asserts that he wishes to accomplish an action, 
say A. and he deliberately takes action B which he knows will thwart 
action A. then to the extent that he told us the truth about A, he is 
acting irrationally. We shall not, in this book, consider what to do 
about whether or not the man told the truth about k That is a task 
for the psychiatrist Rather we shall take the stated goal, A, as 
m e  argument for this sort of mechanism, and its plural consequence ie set out in my Rubbish 
Ybory (Oxford University Press 1879) particularly in Chapter 7. 
**lWQ. Pergemon, p. 2 
correct and develop aids to help decide if the actions are consistent 
with A 
The policy analyst might well find this restriction to just the stated goal 
rather unhelpful. What he would like is some approach that would enable him 
to handle the hidden agendas (as he calls them) as well as the visible ones. 
And, given his daily familiarity with hidden agendas, he may feel that i t  is he, 
not the psychiatrist, who is best equipped to understand the sort of strategis- 
ing behaviour that  sometimes leads a person to take action B when his stated 
aim is action k The policy analyst (when he can advance some plausible 
hypothesis in terms of a hidden agenda and an appropriate strategy for its 
advancement) would dearly like to be able to extend rationality to these sorts 
of actions. 
So classic decision theory certainly cannot handle everything; but, 
surely. within its explicit and self-imposed limits it is valid and useful. Histor- 
ical contingency theory takes issue even with this seemingly modest and inno- 
cuous claim. Classic decision theory, it concedes, can of course claim validity 
in all those cases where people know (and say) what their objective is but his- 
torical contingency theory holds that this is a category with no members. 
Nobody knows what their 'real' interests are. It is a very fundamen- 
tal principle that  nobody knows what is the ultimate effect of almost 
any act  whatsoever ... The actual consequences of almost any act are 
unknown and unforeseen. which is a little rough on the theory of 
rational behaviour.. 
Of course, Boulding may be wrong but, even if he is, classic decision theory 
would still only be a theory of goal-seeking; we would still be without any 
theory of goal-setting. And, if Boulding is right, then we are left without any 
theory a t  all ... of goal-setting o r  goal-seeking. 
REDEFINING THE DECISION THEORIST'S PROBLEM 
Real policies, unlike the decisions analysed by decision theory, usually 
involve a variety of actors and interests, conflicting perceptions of nature, 
contradictory rationalities and divergent advocacies. They are not static 
phenomena but historical processes. The rapid development of decision 
theory, coupled with the decision-maker's desire to know which out of a 
bewildering array of counsels is the 'right' one, has propelled policy analysis 
towards the fallacy of misplaced concreteness-towards a pretence that  things 
are tidier than they really are. But complexity. goal ambiguity, contradictory 
certainties, conflict, institutional inertia, and temporal change are not  disfi- 
guring warts on the face of policy; they are its essential characteristics. The 
central problem, therefore, is to resist the urge to remove them and to re- 
conceive policy in a way that preserves its historical contingency. Only when 
this has been done can we adequately understand an evolving process and the 
extent to which we can both manage its evolution to fit our desires and adapt 
our desires to fit i ts evolution. 
*Kenneth Boulding (1983) Erbiiond hfencs llhrough Sable h u c e ,  (Lectures presented at IIASA, 
JunelJuly, 1 @El 1 .) 
So how do we re-conceive policy-warts and all? Let me suggest that  we 
put goal-seeking to one side for the moment and begin with the really big 
question: "How do the goals that people seek get set?" And let me suggest that  
we approach it by looking a t  two things--socially viable ideas of nature and 
relative surprise. Socially viable ideas of nature correspond to what Mary 
Douglas* has called cultural biases-those sets of shared beliefs and convic- 
tions about how the universe is that  sustain and justify moral judgments. 
Relative surprise is a natural contradiction of a particular idea of nature that 
gets noticed by the holder of that idea. 
SOCIALLY VIABLE IDEAS OF NATURE 
The cultural hypothesis holds that  there are just five distinct cultural 
biases each of which has associated with it  a distinct idea of nature. Each of 
these conjunctions of cultural bias and idea of nature finds itself adopted in 
one particular reach of social life and rejected in all of the others. The dif- 
ferent reaches of social life are descr ib~d  by the two axes of sociul contezt: 
group, which has to do with the extent to which an individual is incorporated 
into or free from bounded social groups, and grid, which has to do with the 
extent to which he is subject to or free from socially-imposed prescriptions. 
Since the processes that give rise to  (and sustain) group-formation and 
prescription-imposition are dynamic processes, group inclusion here implies 
group exclusion somewhere else and being subject to prescription here 
implies subjecting to prescription somewhere else. In other words, the  group 
and grid axes have both positive and negative directions. 
Since group end grid can only be measured on ordinal scales, there are 
only five distinctions to be made within this social context space--one a t  the 
origin and one in each of the four quandrants. In each of these distinct social 
contexts we find a distinct social being: at the centre, the hermit, free from 
coercive involvement in both groupformation and personal network-building; 
a t  the bottom left, the entrepreneur, spurning group involvement and central 
to a large personal network; a t  the top left, the ineffectual, excluded from 
social groups and peripheral to the personal networb of others; a t  top right, 
the himarchist, strongly grouped and willingly subject to all the prescriptions 
that serve to maintain the ranked separation of his group from all the others 
within the group hierarchy; and a t  bottom right, the sectist, strongly grouped 
but rejecting hierarchy and all the prescriptions that are its inevitable accorn- 
paniment (Figure 1). 
I trace these five stabilizable conjunctions of social context and cultural 
bias back to  three distinctive kinds of organisation: the ego-focused network, 
the hierarchically-nested group, and the bounded egalitarian group. I further 
argue that this typology of organisations is exhaustive-that these are  the only 
kirids of organisation that are socially viable. But how can just three kinds of 
organisation give rise to five cultural biases? Such a proposition would appear 
to run counter to Aahby's law of requisite variety. 
The answer has two parts. First. the process of personal network-building 
will  (so long as there exist opportunities for economies of scale) result in an 
asymmetrical pattern of involvement. So,me individuals (the skillful, forceful 
or lucky ones) will become central within large personal networks with the 
result that other individuals (the de-skilled, ineffectual or unlucky ones) will 
*Mary Douglas, 1978. "Cultural Bias" &c&nal kpan of the &aL Adhtopo log icd  h t i t u t e ,  No. 
34, London. 
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'Small is beautiful' 
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Figure 1. Social beings, cultural biases, justifications and ideas of nature. 
find that their network-building is  everywhere pre-empted by the ramifying 
networks of 'The Big Men*. This asymmetry provides the 
centrality/peripherality criterion that serves to separate the prescribing 
entrepreneur from the prescribed ineffectual. Second, a personal strategy 
aimed at the deliberate avoidance of all three organisational forms can also 
(under certain conditions) result in a viable conjunction of social context and 
cultural bias--the hermit's. (It is only coercive social involvement that  the 
hermit has to avoid in order to  achieve stability, and this autonomous cultural 
bias can be remarkably convivial). 
*For a description of this context, see my "The Problem of the Centre" in Mary Douglas (Ed.) k c q p  
in Uu Sbciobgy of Arception (London k New York Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1882). 
I should stress that 1 am following the definition of an organisation as a 
conceptual scheme. I do not wish to suggest that the 'concrete reality'-the 
pocess of social life-crystallizes out so neatly. In general this process is suffi- 
ciently complex and messy for anyone involved in i t  to be able to conceive it, 
and render a p l a d l e  account of if, in one of these three ways. The pattern- 
ings and transformations of this 'concrete reality' are to be understood as the 
resultant of these contradictory conceptual schemes as they are acted upon 
by those who variously hold to them. 
So the central idea is that each organisational form has, all the time, to 
generate within itself the forces that will hold i t  together. Otherwise, it will 
fall apart (or become transformed into one of the others). ldeas of nature, and 
the moral justifications that they provide the basis for, are the means by 
which these organisational needs are met. In each context just one idea of 
nature is capable of providing the necessary stabilizing forces and all the oth- 
ers would inevitably result in its transformation. 
For example, pragmatic materialism provides a strategy (or behavioural 
programme) that reinforces the social context of economic individualism and, 
at  the same time, receives its moral justification (and shareability-the neces- 
sary condition for moral community) from the 'skill-controlled cornucopia' 
idea of nature. The great moral justification for economic individualism is 
'the hidden hand' that steadily adds to the welfare of the whole, and i t  would 
lose all its validity if life were revealed to be a zero-sum game (or, worse still. 
a negative-sum game). A strictly accountable nature, therefore, is unthink- 
able. Nature mus t  be cornucopian. The skill-controlled part of this idea of 
nature provides the basis for the other great moral justification of economic 
individualism-equality of opportunity. If fortune favours the brave, i f  unused 
talents atrophy, if faint heart never wins fair lady, if there is a tide in the 
affairs of men that  must be taken at the flood. if a fool and his money are soon 
parted ... if nothing succeeds like success, then inequality of result can never 
be a moral reproach to those who have acted with skill and daring. 
Conversely, those whose results are less impressive can fashion for them- 
selves a m o t h s  v ivendi  by making just a small modification to  this cornu- 
copian idea of nature. Where the successful emphasize skill and daring, the 
unsuccessful can emphasize luck (and a measure of unfair advantage). If it's 
all in the stars. if your number is on it, if it's your (or, more likely, his) lucky 
day, if it's the same the whole world over ... if it's always the rich what gets the 
gravy, then the erratic payouts and withholdings can all be understood in 
terms of a cornucopian nature that is controlled not by skill but by l o t t e r y a  
one-armed bandit on the cosmic scale. When, as occasionally happens, the 
jackpot comes your way ... oh happy day! When. as usually happens, i t  does not 
... those crafty bastards have got it fixed. 
The hermit's social con text. likewise, is individualised-there are no 
bounded groups around-but, unlike the contexts of the entrepreneur and the 
ineffectual. there are no economies of scale around either. Cosrnopolitan 
Sherpas who can grow their own potatoes and raise their own yaks, interna- 
tional owner-driver haulage contractors who can only drive one lorry at  a time 
... easy-going caretakers who can only look after one modest office building a t  
a time have little incentive to build and maintain vast coercive personal net- 
works. What would they use them for? Their social isolation means that, if 
they are not economically viable, they will not be around for long and so this 
means that  virtually all those hermits that are around are economically 
viable. If enough comes in (and the fact that they are still there means that  
enough is coming in) then enough is enough; if excessive effort just leads to 
heavy scenes, if pissing matches with skunks are always disappointing, ... if in 
getting and spending we lay waste our powers, then what we need are some 
gentle moral marker flags to prevent us from inadvertently straying into coer- 
cive social involvement (be it in personal networks or group formation). Take, 
therefore, no thought for morrow; consider, instead, the lilies of the field ... 
get your autonomous act together, man, and nature will provide. For such a 
quietist morality to remain credible, nature must be cornucopian, but i t  can- 
not be skill-controlled nor can it  be lottery-controlled. I t  must be freely avail- 
able. 
In this way one idea of nature--the cornucopian-sustains all three indivi- 
dualised contexts. But each context modifies that idea to suit its paticular 
manifestation of the single organisational type that  provides their common 
origin--the ego-focused network. With no economies of scale networks remain 
little developed and the cornucopia remains freely available. As economies of 
scale are introduced so a number of things happen. Networks become com- 
petitively developed, an asymmetry opens up between those who are central 
and those who are peripheral, the cornucopia becomes controlled, and the 
mode of that  control bifurcates between skill and lottery (Figure 2): 
SKILL 
hd I i  SKILL- CONTROLLED CORNUCOPIA 
DECREASING ECONOMIES 
OF SCALE 
INCRECSING ECONOMIES 
OF SCALE 
I w a i r p  N m r k i n g  
LOTTERY- 
CONTROLLED 
CORNUCOPIA 
Rgure 2. The three cornucopian ideas of nature. 
*For a rigorous treatment of this argument, see W. Brian Mhur, "On Competing Technologies and 
Historical Small Events: The dynamics of choice under increasing returns", Worldng Paper, IIASA, 
Laxenburg, Austria, 1889. 
Where the tragedy of competitive individualism is the tragedy of the com- 
mons, the tragedy of the bounded egalitarian group (the sect) is almost the 
exact reverse-the tragedy of the crabs in a barrel. In the West Indies fisher- 
men will put their day's catch of live crabs into a barrel. Though crabs are 
good climbers, the fishermen do not bother to put a lid on top of the barrel 
because no sooner does one crab climb up towards the rim than it is immedi- 
ately pulled back down by its fellows. All the crabs could escape if only they 
were prepared to allow some to go first. But they are not, and they all perish. 
The great moral justification needed to sustain the sect is equality, not of 
opportunity, but of result. To allow priority to some for the sake of the bene- 
fits that will eventually accrue to all would be to transgress the rule of abso- 
lute equality which, in the absence of the sorts of differentiations that exist in 
markets and in bureaucracies, has to be the sect's sole organising principle. 
Positive-sum games, in consequence, are unthinkable. Life has to be a zero- 
sum (or, better still, a negative-sum) game. A world of resource depletion is 
the environment best suited to the nurture of a bounded egalitarian group. 
And a world of resource depletion is guaranteed by an idea of nature as strictly 
accountable. 
Accountable nature also provides the basis for the sect's other great 
moral justification-that which serves to maintain the sharpness of the boun- 
dary that separates the saved on the inside from the damned on the outside. 
The sect members, by their insistence on equality of result, make sure that  
they respect Nature's fragile limits. lt  is those in the wicked world beyond the 
sect that are misusing her. In this way the boundary between inside and out- 
side is sharply drawn between those who respect Nature and those who abuse 
her. Blamerys tem blame-can then be exported. 
Both the cornucopian and the accountable ideas of nature would wreak 
havoc inside that complex edifice-a hierarchical collectivity. The first would 
undermine the boundaries that sustain its highly discriminated structure; the 
second would erode the status differences that those boundaries uphold. But, 
of course, the sort of environment that is created by hierarchically-nested 
groups rejects both these ideas of nature. The mutual reinforcement that i t  
needs to sustain its existence has no place for individual salvation and no 
place for equality of result. Rather, it is all geared up to adopt a collectivised 
and stratified mode of salvation-everyone in Peter's barque but with first- 
class, second-class and steerage passengers! In a hierarchy, all men do not 
end up equal; it is this that distinguishes it from a sect. Nor do they all start  
off equal; i t  is this that distinguishes it from an  ego-focused network. In 
consequence, neither the moral principle of equality of result nor that of 
equality of opportunity can mesh with the premise of inequality that sustains 
a hierarchy. Rather, a hierarchy will stress equality before the law--a 
hierarchical law that embodies the premise of inequality and entitles those of 
high rank to be tried by their peers. Peer review--the established method of 
assessment in the scientific communi ty~rovides  a nice example of this 
moral principle a t  work. 
So hierarchy needs rather complicated moral justifications if i t  is not to 
be eroded. It needs to justify inequality and it needs to justify separation. 
Cornucopian nature. with its positive-sum game, would justify inequality but 
would be destructive of separation. Accountable nature, on the other hand, 
would justify separation but would pillory inequality. The solution is an iso- 
wuqhic nature that does permit positive-sum games but within certain 
defined bounds. 
On this view nature and society are both complex, yet clearly separate, 
systems. Though separate they are isomorphic; nature, as it were, holds up a 
mirror to society. If nature is a positive-sum game (and there is nothing in 
this mirror idea to insist that i t  is not) then so too is society. If riches bubble 
up in nature, it is probably thanks to nature's clearly understood complexity; 
and, if they are bubbling up there, it is probably because they are the accu- 
rate reflection of the positive-sum benefits that flow from the division of 
labour and status within society. But, if the complexity of the two matched 
systems is the source of these collective benefits. then it is absolutely vital 
that the clarity and resolution of the mirror be maintained-that the isomor- 
phism be assiduously preserved. Clarity, predictability, discrimination, 
resolving power and order-these are the great moral imperatives that are 
generated by the isomorphic idea of nature. Look after them and the 
positive-sum benefits will look after themselves. 
POLRICAL CULTURES AND PART-REGIMES 
In tracing social contexts back to viable organisational forms. and in trac- 
ing cultural biases back to shareable ideas of nature, we are able to uncover a 
very general self-segregating system within which certain conjunctions of 
social environment and idea of nature become (by a process of moral justifica- 
tion) mutually reinforcing while other conjunctions (by a process of moral 
indefensibility) become mutually repulsive. I t  is this system of attractive and 
repulsive forces that ever maintains the possibility for the existence of the 
five stabilizable conjunctions. 
So these are the eternal bases, as it  were, onto which we home-in; and i t  
is this homing-in process that  induces and maintains the distinctive personal 
strategies that go with each cultural bias: two manipulative strategies-the 
individualist and the collectivist-that are adopted by the entrepreneur and 
the hierarchist respectively; two survival strategies--the individualist and the 
collectivist-that are adopted by the ineffectual and the  sectist respectively; 
and one autonomous strategy that, by steering clear of the sorts of social 
involvement that  inevitably result in manipulating others or being rnanipu- 
lated, soon recommends itself to the hermit. 
When these socially-induced personal strategies are combined with the  
historical processes of change, they become imbued with a sense of direction 
and come to resemble closely the evolutionarily stable strategies that have so 
revolutionized our understanding of biological evolution.* The result of this 
sense of direction is a set of different goals or futures that  have a sort of final 
cause quality in that  they are projected 'out there' by the various desires that 
are socially generated in the 'here-and-now'. So this combination of socially- 
induced strategy and historical contingency is the source of the god-settmg, 
and the various ideas of nature provide the justificatory bases for the  pursuit 
of those goals. In this way ideas of nature become political in the deepest pos- 
sible sense of the word. This is because (thanks to the link that cultural bias 
provides between the  realm of ideas and realm of actions) aperson who acts in 
accordance with a particular idea of nature will be acting to strengthen the 
particular organisational form that receives its ultimate justification from 
that idea of nature. 
*J. Maynard Smith. 1880. "Evolutionary Game Theory" in Claudio Barigozzi (Ed.) W o  h l t s r a  &m- 
posium on ~ n u a t u d  Models in &logy. Loctun hbtes in B o d h s m d i c s  hb. 38, Berlin, 
Heidelkrg, New York, Spriqer-Verlag, pp. m81. 
Obviously, for policy analysis, this deep political aspect-the setting of 
goals in terms of preferred patterns of social arrangements, the apriori  moral 
justifications for those goals, and the strategic bases for their pursuit-will be 
the main focus of interest within this cultural theory. Since the biases are 
cultural, and since their significance is polifical, it seems reasonable when 
handling them in this particular aspect to speak of them as political cultures. 
And finally, when those who variously hold to these political cultures act in 
accordance with them, they generate within the concrete reality-within the 
process of social life-the distinctive part-regimes that are the  basic building 
blocks from which political regimes are constituted. In this way the concept 
of political cultures provides the essential, and currently missing, link 
between ideas and actions--between moral philosophy and political science 
(Figure 3).* 
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Figure 3. The five-part-regimes. 
We can now define political rationality. An act is rational if it  supports 
one's political culture. And, conversely, any act that supports one's political 
culture is political. Now we are in business. 
POLlTICAL CULTURES AND THE FORMATION OF POLICY 
Of these five political cultures only three are likely to be active in any 
policy debate; the ineffectuals cannot gain access, and the  hermits deli- 
berately steer clear of all that  sort of involvement. So policy debates are 
biased in the sense that two rationalities-the rationalifiy of fatalism (slavery) 
and the  rationality of immediacy (autonomy)-though present in the popu- 
lace, are not represented in the debates. At their widest the debates will 
encompass just three rationalities-market r a f i o d i f y  (anarchy), bweau- 
cratic r a t b d i t y  (hierarchy), and the  ~ a t i o d i t y  of truculence (equity). Each 
of these, drawing on its appropriate strategy and idea of nature, projects its 
desired future 'out there' and then fleshes out into a living scenario the 
*Here I can do little more than mention the idea of part-regimes For an initial development of 
this idea, and of the e+scntial pluralism that it entails, see Aaron Wildavskp's Iho lkTsing Fhfher: 
Afozrs as a R~liticd b u d m  (University of Alabama Praa 1884). 
trajectory by which it must be reached. Like myths, scenarios work them- 
selves out in men and, like hope, they spring eternal in the human breast. 
Such scenarios, of course, are historically contingent (which is why they 
have to go on and on working themselves out and why they spring eternal) b i t  
at  present they are nicely contrasted within the energy debate as the  business 
as usual scenario (anarchy and market rationality), the middle-of-the-road 
(technical fiz) scenario (hierarchy and bureaucratic rationality) and the no- 
growth (&&al change now) scenario (equity and the rationality of trucu- 
lence) (figure 4): 
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Kgure 4. The political rationalities and their scenarios. 
JUSTIFYING THE SCENARIOS 
Our ecologist and our physicist hold their different ideas of nature, not 
because of differences between ecology and physics as systems of howledge, 
but because of the different ways in which each of them is caught up in the 
social organisation of those systems of howledge. The ecologist is a char- 
ismatic figure in a sect-like environmentalist group; the physicist is a 'Big 
M a n m i n  his youth, the Manhattan Project. more recently, the forceful leader- 
ship of a vast national laboratory. It is to these very different social contexts, 
and not to differences between ecology and physics, that their ideas of nature 
should be traced. 
*The names of these scenarios are derived from Peter Chapman. (1975) Auls Prmrdiro, (London: 
Penguin) who, in turn, derived them from &loring e n s m  chouos, a preliminary report published 
by the Energy Policy Project, the Ford Foundation 
The world of resource abundance that is provided for him by his cornu- 
copian idea of nature furnishes our entrepreneurial physicist with the perfect 
justification for his business-as-usual scenario and for the specific energy pol- 
icies that will lead him to that glorious future. And, at  the same time as it is 
justifying these polices, it is highlighting the nonsenses entailed in those rival 
policies that are striving towards different and, to his mind, less rosy futures.* 
In contrast, a world of rapid resource depletion-the inevitable consequence of 
such expansive behaviour in an accountable nature- is  the perfect justifica- 
tion for the radical-change-now scenario and for the draconian measures that 
are needed if i t  is to be reached ... before it is too late. But isomorphic nature 
clashes with both of these. Discounting both resource abundance and resource 
depletion, isomorphic nature provides a world of resource scarcity. Resource 
scarcity justifies extensive government intervention in the market but. at  the 
same time, rejects the argument for sudden change. Rather, it becomes a 
question of carefully controlled and meticulously planned adjustment and 
transition. 
So these notions of resources are the carrots-the 'natural' inducements 
to act in certain ways and to advocate certain policies. And they are  accom- 
panied by the sticks-the 'natural' penalties that  will be incurred if the carrots 
are disregarded; these are risks. 
The cultural theory of risk begins by rejecting the literalist view that  
risks are objective but, a t  the same time, it does not claim that  risks are are 
all in the mind. All it says is that risks are selected and that there is a social 
basis to the resulting pattern of selection biases.** Risks are selected (and 
rejected) in such a way as to maintain a stable relationship between social 
context (organisation) and cultural bias (idea of nature). I can use the work of 
a political scientist, David W. Orr, to explain the different energy-related risks 
that gain salience in each political culture and the way they help to advance 
the hidden political agenda-the ushering in of a desired style of governance. 
RISK FOR 
Orr,*** in trying to  make some sense out of the energy debate in the 
United States, has identified three distinct perspectives each of which is 
appropriate to a se t  of primary actors and with each of which goes a preferred 
style of governance and a distinct set of salient risks. Each perspective, more- 
over, gains its particular orientation from the distinctive way in which the  
problem is defined. It is here, in the credible ways of defining the problem, 
that  the different ideas of nature come into play but before investigating that 
I should point out that  Orr's scheme is impressively redundant in that  each 
perspective's distinctness is defined over and over again by a whole list of dif- 
ferent criteria-it  is a polythetic classification. **** For instance, he  goes on to 
separate out the  different energy goals that  each perspective is striving 
*For a more detailed account of this see my "Among the Energy Tribes: The Anthropology of the 
Current Policy Debate", U S A ,  Worhng Paper, WP-82-58. 
* 6 e e  Douglar, Mary and Wildavsky, Aaron (1982), IKsk and CUturs, (Berkeley: University of Cali- 
fornia Pres). 
***Om, David W. (lW7). 'US Energy Policy and the Political Economy of Participation'. llhs J o d  
of hliticr, Vol. 41, pp. 102)-58. 
****Redundancy does not mean that all but one of these criteria are unnecesaaq. That would be 
true only if the environment in which each perspective was bemg maintained was completely calm 
and this is most certainly not the case here. Each perspective's environment contains the other 
rival perspectives and, in consequence, is turbulent in the extreme. In such an environment, 
redundancy is ewntial to viability. 
towards, he lists the qualitiative value changes that will be entailed, and he 
ends up with the different 'ultimate energy sources'. 
In what Orr calls the Supply Perspective the problem is inadequate energy  
supply ,  the primary actors are the energy  corporations,  the preferred style of 
governance is h i s s e z - f a i r e a  minimum of government involvementand the 
salient risks are those associated with economic disruptinn. In the Conserva- 
t i on  Perspectiue the problem is energy  w a s t e ,  the primary actor is g o v e n -  
m e n t ,  the preferred style of governance is L e v i a t h m a  major role for 
governmentand the salient risks are those associated with balance of pay-  
m e n t s ,  ouerseas dependence ,  and energy  w a s .  In the Energetics Perspective 
the problem is social and  cultural ,  the primary actors are the public (I would 
prefer to say the public in te res t  groups) ,  the preferred style of governance is 
Jeffersonian--one in which a participatory citizenry blows the whistle on 
governmentand the salient risks are technological acc ident ,  resource 
ezhcarstion, and c l imate  chnnge (Figure 5 ) .  
Rgure 5. Orr's framework 
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The polythetic quality of this classification laces each perspective 
together into a whole package, as it were, and in so doing emphasizes the 
unity of each and their clear separation from one another. I put the &timute 
energy sources  together in a separate box in order to emphasize that each 
package is assembled in such a way as to lead inevitably to the desired future, 
while each is so separated from the others as to constitute a c h r e o d a  neces- 
sary path-that, once committed, cannot be changed. This does not mean to 
say that policy cannot hop this way and that between these paths but only that 
the three paths that between them define the policy space will always remain 
clearly separate. 
One consequence of all this is that risk is never just risk but always 'risk 
for' (in the same way that history is always 'history for')'. The 'risks for' are 
the sticks-the sanctions--that are being used to drive the society towards the 
desired energy future and, more importantly, towards the desired pattern of 
social relations that is perceived as accompanying that  future. Risks in other 
words, are selected in order to provide rationalizations (in terms of the dif- 
ferent rationalities that inform each cultural bias) for preferred patterns of 
social relations. That, given the inevitability of 'risk for', is the cultural defin- 
ition of risk. 
BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 
Most policy analysis approaches policy debates in terms of 'the decision 
making process'. Such an approach begins (like Orr) by identifying 'the 
interested parties'-the groups and individuals who, in pressing their different 
advocacies, give rise to the debate. Such an approach has to assume: 
(a) that those who are not party to the debate are not interested; 
(b) that the reason for the interest of the interested parties is self- 
evident-it is essentially self-interest; 
(c) that what they are talking about in the debate is what they are 
interested in. 
The cultural approach queries these assumptions rather in the way that 'the 
New Journalism'" queries the assumption that reportage (mere reportage. 
some diehard positivists would say) is just some self-evident data-base from 
which literary creation then takes off. In querying these assumptions it has 
us ask some unfamiliar and intriguing questions: 
(a) What of those who are interested but cannot gain entry to the debate, 
and what of those whose interest is best served by steering well clear of 
the debate? 
(b) How do people who act in their own best interest come to h o w  where 
that interest lies; that is, how are the goals they seek set? 
*Levi-Straus, Claude (1888), ~ Shtugo Mind, London, Wiedenfeld and Nicholson, p. 251. 
"Literary people were oblivious to this side of the New Journalism, because it is one of the uncons- 
cioue assumptions of modem criticism that the raw material is simply 'there1. It is the 'given'. 
The idea is: given such-and-such a body of material, what has the artist done mth it? The crucial 
part that reporting playa in all story-telling, whether in novels, films, or non-fiction, is s o m e w  
that is not .o much ignored aa simply not comprehended." 
[Tom Wolfe 1973, 'The Feature Came" in Tom Wolfe and E.W. Johnson (Eds.), ?ha Naw kurndism, 
Picador, 1875 edn., London, p. 27.1 
(c) What about the hidden agenda; if all those parties are really arguing 
about something e l s e a b o u t  what kind of society we should live in- 
should we not try to read the debate in those terms and regard its visible 
agenda as little more than a convenient medium for the expression of 
these social concerns? 
These are the questions that cultural theory tries to answer. 
Orr's framework is, of course, historically con t ingen t i t  is specific to a 
particular society (that of the United States) and to a particular period (the 
late 'seventies) in the history of that  society. I t  certainly makes a lot of sense 
of the space-time context to which it is anchored and, in addition, it  provides a 
tantalisingly suggestive orientation for understanding other debates in other 
places and at other times. The problem, therefore, is to somehow or other cut 
the adhesions that tie this framework to its unique historical context so that  
we can move towards an understanding of the eternal bases of which it is but 
one specific manifestation. How, in other words, do we move from phenomena 
to their possibility? 
Orr's scheme is essentially an explanation in terms of goal-seeking; the 
goals being set by the evident self-interest of his primary actors. To cut it  
free from its anchorage in space and time we need to underpin it  with an 
explanation at the much deeper level of goal-setting. We need to ask how it is 
that the primary actors can come to know where the self-interest that they 
act in lies. But we have already answered this question--the explanation of 
goal-setting is to be found in the mutually reinforcing relationships between 
organisational types and ideas of nature. All we need to do is to  slide this eter- 
nal cultural framework beneath Orr's historically contingent scheme (Figure 
6) - 
Figure 6. The cultural underpinning for Om's framework. 
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Again, this classification is polythetic and, again, 1 have put the scenarios in a 
separate box in order to emphasize the way in which each 
cultural/organisational package is put together in such a way as to lead inev- 
itably to the desired future. Nor is this a complete framework; it  is possible to 
go on adding more and more separation criteria. thereby adding to the 
strength of the separation between the three packages. The three participat- 
ing rationalities, for instance. can be added and so too can Lakatos's anomaly- 
handling styles-monster-accommodrrting fits the expedient opportunism of 
the entrepreneur, monster-adjusting nicely matches the sorts of rearrange- 
ments that leave the hierarchistes essential frame unaltered. and monster- 
b a m n g  perfectly expresses the 'foreign body expulsion' that serves to main- 
tain the sect's pure equality.' 
ENTREPRENEUR 
Ego-focused 
network 
Pragmatic 
materialism 
Individualist 
manipulative 
Sldll-controlled 
cornucopia 
Resource 
abundance 
(culturally 
bestowed) 
Economic 
rinks (market) 
Ancvc hy 
HERARCHIST 
Hierarchically- 
nested group 
Ritualism & 
sacrifice 
Collectivist 
manipulative 
Isomorphic 
Resource 
scarcity 
(culturally b e  
stowed with- 
in natural 
frame) 
Control risks 
(bureaucracy) 
Hierarchy 
@LaLatm, Imre. 1878. h o b  and RsfUations: Z?n  Logic 01 Aidhemoticd k w r r y ,  Cambridge 
SECTIST 
Bounded 
egalitarian 
group 
Millenaranism / 
Fundamentalism 
Collectivist 
survival 
Accountable 
Resource 
depletion 
(naturally 
hestowed) 
Involuntary 
and irreversible 
rinks (voluntarism) 
EW~Y 
Businesswisusual Middle-of-the- 
road 
Radical-change- 
now 
The cultural hypothesis's polythetic classification, you could say, is like a 
tool-kit. You can go on and on adding to i t  and, though this may be a satisfy- 
ing activity in itself, the main thing is to develop some sort of 'feel' that will 
enable you to select from i t  the most appropriate tools for each particular job 
of policy analysis. 
REIATIVESURPRlSE 
This section draws heavily upon collaborative work carried out at  the 
Institute of Resource Ecology, a t  the University of British Columbia and at  the  
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Austria. It concerns 
five case studies in the management of living r e sou rce s~o re s t s  and pests. 
fisheries, savannah grazing, forest fires, and plant and human disease. Each 
was selected for its social or economic importance and each has had a trou- 
bled and surprise-ridden management history. The part of the study that par- 
ticularly concerns us is that in which the various management policies and 
goals are examined "in order tp  identify the apparent concepts of reality that  
generated them."* The result is a typology of what the authors call myths of 
nature. 
Myths of nature are "partial representations of reality". Such myths are 
the cultural devices by which we can capture, in an elegant and simple form, 
some essence of experience or wisdom. Myths, in the face of our inevitably 
incomplete knowledge, guide our actions and moderate our fears of the unk- 
nown. Without myths we would be in a bad way. Since each is replete with 
accumulated wisdom, the question is not whether we should have myths or not 
but, rather. which myths we should have. The obvious answer is to have them 
al--to pool all that accumulated wisdom and experience--but this option. i t  
would seem, is not available. Each myth contradicts all the others, and to 
embrace one we must first reject the rest. The case studies show that we do 
this not with reluctance but with alacrity. Different management institutions 
home-in onto the different myths and, once there, cling onto them as if their 
very lives depended on them. Cultural theory shows us that they do. 
Though I have yet to effect the mapping of these myths of nature onto the 
ideas of nature that sustain the viability of social organisations, the similari- 
ties and perhaps, even, the identities between them are already becoming 
apparent. While this trend is gra t i fy ingi t  is. after all, what I am trying to  
do-I should pause for a minute to stress the totally different theoretical ori- 
gins of the ideas and the myths. While the ideas of nature have been deduced 
from the different kinds of moral justifications needed to stabilise different 
patterns of social relations, the myths of nature are arrived a t  entirely by eco- 
logical argumentation. The ecologist studies the forest as a system of which 
the trees are one crucial part. The soil. the rain, the sun's energy, the birds 
Bloor, David. 1882. "Polyhedra and the abominations of Leviticus in Mary Dougles (Ed.), &says in 
the s o c w l o ~ y  o j p o r c a p t i a ,  London and New York, Ruutledge and Kegan Paul. 
*The relevant papem are: C.S. Holling, "Myths of Ecological Stability: Resilience and the Roblem of 
Failure" in C.F. Smart and W.T. Stanbury (Eds.) S h d i u s  in (%sk   am ant, Montreal. Butter- 
worth for the h t i t u t e  for Research on Public Policy, pp. 87-109. 
C.S. Ho-, C.J. Waltera and D. Ludwig, "Myths, Time Scaler and Surprise in Ecological 
Management". (This is an unpublished draft which expands on Holling's published paper). Though 
most the quotes I give a n  from the published paper, I have dram extensively on the ideas con- 
tained in the unpublished paper and, for this reamn, refer to "the authord' throughout rather than 
just to Holling. 
and the bees are other components of that system and so too, when they make 
their presence felt, are the spruce budworms whose depredations have caused 
so much alarm among those who strive to manage the forest resource. The 
managing institutions then act,  modifying the eco-system and thereby them- 
selves becoming the objects of the  ecologist's scrutiny. The ecologist, there- 
fore, encounters these institutions in a way that is altogether different from 
the way the anthropologist encounters them. He encounters them as particu- 
lar patterns of intervention in the eco-system he is studying; and what he 
finds particularly interesting is that,  faced with exactly the same situation, 
different management institutions intervene in completely different ways. 
The myths of nature are then deduced from these observations. They are the 
minimal representations of reality that have to be ascribed to the various 
management institutions if those institutions are to be granted the dignity of 
rationality. 
The authors identify four myths of nature which, they claim, constitute a 
Compleat Mythology. For reasons that  will shortly become apparent, I will put 
their fourth myth-The Myth of Nature Resilient--to one side for a moment and 
consider just the first three: Nature Benign, Nature Ephemeral and Nature 
Perverse/Tolerant. The challenge is to map these myths of nature onto the 
ideas of nature. If the s y s t e m  of constrained re la t i v i sm hypothesis is valid 
then these two--the myths of nature (derived from resource ecology) and the 
ideas of nature (derived from the  sociology of perception)--should meet up. If 
they can be mapped onto one another the synthesis is achieved; if they cannot 
the synthesis has failed. 
THE MAPPING 
The authors' approach is by way of suqmise. They do not, of course, speak 
of re la t ive  surpr ise  but the fact that  these case studies all have a "troubled 
and surprise-ridden management history" means that the surprises they focus 
on have all been noticed and have, in some way or other, challenged the vari- 
ous management myths. Since the way managed systems respond to unex- 
pected events is determined by their stability properties, the authors charac- 
terise the myths as myths of stability. The stability myth for Nature Benign is 
a ball in a basin, for Nature Ephemeral it is a ball on top of an upturned basin; 
and for Nature Perverse/Tolerant it is a ball in a basin-like depression on top 
of a mesa. 
Nature Benign is wonderfully forgiving; it does not matter what knocks 
you deliver, the ball will always find its way back to the equilibrium position. 
Nature Ephemeral is terrifyingly unforgiving; nature is so fragile that the 
least jolt may cause its complete collapse. Nature Pewerse/Tolerant is a 
curious, but comfortingly static, combination of these two. Jolts, in modera- 
tion, are alright but you must be careful not to knock the ball right out onto 
the mesa. With Nature Benign "the hidden h a n d  becomes entirely credible- 
just let everyone knock the ball around as energetically as possible and we'll 
soon find out where the bottom of the bowl is. And the existence of global sta- 
bility removes all misgivings about large-scale action. Big becomes necessary. 
With Nature Ephemeral we get the  exact opposite. Of course, the fact that we 
are still here despite our perturbations makes this myth a non-starter, but we 
only need to introduce a small dose of spatial heterogeneity for the myth to 
become locally tenable and that  is all that those who advocate those small 
tight-knit communities need in order to justify a respect for nature's fragile 
limits and to insist that  small is beautiful. 
Nature Benign encourages and justifies bold and individualistic experi- 
mentation. But such behaviour becomes unspeakably selfish and irresponsi- 
bly destructive if nature is ephemeral. Nature Ephemeral requires us, first, to 
set up effective group sanctions to prevent this sort of thing from happening 
and, second, to join together in joyous celebration of incuriosity and trepidity. 
Though Nature Perverse/Tolerant contains elements of the other myths. it  
turns out to  be completely different from them both. Where Nature Benign 
encourages bold experimentation in the face of uncertainty, and Nature 
Ephemeral encourages timorous forbearance, Nature Perverse/Tolerant 
encourages the pursuit of certainty and predictability. If there is a boundary 
line (a separatriz) between equilibrium and disequilibrium then you can act 
boldly right up to that  limit. Individualistic exuberance is all very well so long 
as it  does not cross the line, strong group sanctions will be needed to prevent 
this from happening and, to apply those effectively. you need to know just 
where the line is. 
The authors go on elaborating the consequences of these myths (for 
instance, centralisation goes with Nature Benign, anarchy with Nature Ephem- 
eral and control with Nature Perverse/Tolerant) to produce an impressive 
polythetic classification, but we already have enough criteria to confidently 
map Nature Benign onto the skill-controlled cornucopia idea of nature that 
sustains the entrepreneur. Nature Ephemeral onto the accountable idea of 
nature that  sustains the sectist, and Nature Perverse/Tolerant onto the iso- 
morphic idea of nature that sustains the hierarchist. But this, encouraging 
though it is, is only a partial mapping. What about the Lottery-cont7oLled and 
the jkeely a v d a b l e  cornucopia ideas of nature and where, if anywhere, does 
the myth of Nature Resilient fit in? 
The Compleat Mythology, i t  turns out, is not complete. Since few if any 
hermits or ineffectuals are likely to  be found filling senior positions in fores- 
try services or heading up international programs for the eradication of 
malaria, the authors have understandably missed two myths of nature-Nature 
Capricious and Nature Truly Benign. 
Nature Capricious is the myth that would map onto the the lo t teq-  
confroUed conzucopin idea of nature that  sustains the ineffectual. Here the 
ball sits neither in a bowl, nor on a bump, nor on a mesa. I t  clatters around a 
roulette wheel. The hermit is more of a problem. It is the pursuit of centrali- 
sation and the imperative of big-is-necessary, that are encouraged and justi- 
fied by the myth of Nature Benign, that give rise to both the entrepreneur's 
centrality and the ineffectual's peripherality within the ego-focused networks 
by which both centralisation and bigness are achieved. Since it  ends up doing 
this to the ineffectual, the entrepreneur's myth is not exactly benign. Nature 
Benign, you could say, is the public face of the entrepreneurial cultural bias. 
The lion lying down with the lamb is. properly speaking. the hermit's idea of 
nature but there are good explanations for the entrepreneur stealing it from 
him when it suits his purpose. 
The rain it raineth on the just 
And also on the  unjust fella: 
But chiefly on the just, because 
The unjust steals the just's umbrella.' 
*Lard Bowen (1 835 1804) quoted in Walter Sichel, Sands 03 h. 
When due allowance is made for this libertarian sleight-of-hand, Nature 
Benign begins to give way to Nature Red in Tooth and Claw. 
Since hermits and ineffectuals do not participate in policy debates, the 
authors have not come across them in their case studies and so have had no 
option but to take the entrepreneur's eye-view of the ego-focused network. 
Recourse to the cultural framework allows us to take in the other two individu- 
alist eye-views and to make the appropriate modification to the 
entrepreneur's myth. The hermit's social 'context is stabilized by an absence 
of opportunities for economies of scale and by a myth of nature as Truly 
Benign. When economies of scale are present we get a separation between net- 
work centrality (stabilized by the entrepreneur's myth of Nature Somewhat 
Falsely Benign) and network peripherality (stabilized by the ineffectual's myth 
of Nature Capricious). 
A final quibble is that anarchy cannot really go with Nature Ephemeral 
and with small-is-beautiful. This myth and its associated aesthetic principle 
reject unbridled individualism (true anarchy). What they enjoin is small egali- 
tarian groups and the coercive utopianism that is needed to sustain them. 
Anarchy may feature in the rhetoric of such groups but not in their reality 
(figure 7) .  
I& a of n d u r e :  
Lottery-controlled 
cornucopia 
Myth of nature: 
Nature Capricious 
Idea of nature: 
Isomorphic 
mth of .nature: 
Nature Perverse/Tolerant 
Idea oj' n d u r e :  
Freely available 
cornucopia 
Myth of nature: 
Nature Benign 
Idea 01 n d u r e :  
Skill-controlled 
cornucopia 
Myth oj' nature : 
Nature Red in Tooth 
and Claw (behind 
Benign facade) 
Rgure 7. Relative surprise (myths of nature) mapped onto socially viable 
ideas of nature. 
Idea 01 nature: 
Accountable 
Myth 01 .natum: 
Nature Ephemeral 
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THE MYTH OF NATURE RESIUENT 
Though the authors insist that myths are simple and elegant representa- 
tions, the ball-and-landscape that goes with Nature Resilient is nowhere near 
so simple or so elegant as those that accompany the other myths. The argu- 
ment is that, though both the ball-in-a-bowl and the ball-on-a-bump are each 
present locally in the ball-in-a-bowl-on-a-mesa landscape, the pursuit of 
kmowledge and certainty that characterises that myth is still misguided 
because it fails to recognize that the movement of the ball itself bransforms 
that landscape. Because it fails to capture these crucial transformational pro- 
perties, the myth of Nature Perverse/Tolerant encourages management poli- 
cies that start well but end up increasing the brittleness (and hence the 
unmanagability) of the system. Keeping the ball away from the boundary line 
works, and goes on working, until that unsuspected moment when the bowl 
suddenly ceases to be a bowl and becomes a bump instead, and then all is lost. 
So we could say that the myth of Nature Resilient is an attempt to capture 
these transformational systems properties that are not captured by any of the 
other myths. 
But Nature Resilient. though i t  captures some essence of wisdom and 
experience that is not captured by Nature Benign, Nature Ephemeral or 
Nature Perverse/Tolerant, is not a myth in the same way that these others 
are myths. it does not have the simplicity and elegance of the other 
myths. In the myth of Nature Resilient the duality--the clear separation--of 
the two key elernents--the landscape and the ball--becomes compromised in 
some mysterious way (or, at  any rate, is a way that is not at  all elegantly or 
simply captured by the myth). 
But the topography itself is not static ... . Changing the values of 
parameters can change the stability landscape ... the values of these 
parameters at any moment define the Form of the topographic 
landscape. In essence, natural selection produces a balanced set of 
parameters whose value is, in part, the consequence of the historic 
variation of the system. Changing the patterns of variability can 
thus change this balance. Moreover ... often there is little change in 
the topography until a certain point, when the topography suddenly 
shifts: stability regions "implode"; new regions of stability and insta- 
bility appear. There are, in short, separatrices in parameter space as 
well as in state variable space.* 
The second curious property of the myth of Nature Resilient is that you can 
get to i t  only by criticising the other myths. When the myths of nature are 
mapped onto the ideas of nature we can pin down this distinction more pre- 
cisely. The simple and elegant myths readily map onto the ideas (and so too 
do the two myths that go with the hermit and the ineffectual) but there is no 
place on this map for the myth of Nature Resilient. The reason is that Nature 
Resilient can only be reached by bending over backwards to compensate for 
cultural bias whereas the other myths are what you get when you give full rein 
to the different cultural biases. Nature Resilient can be expressed only as a 
reaction to  the other myths. I t  is, therefore, a t r r a t s c e d m t  rnyth--a meta- 
myth, as it were, that allows us, in some way, to pool all the wisdom and 
experience that is contained in the contradictory primary myths. 
*C.S. Holling, "Myths of Ecological Stability; Resilience and the problem of failure", op.cit. pp. 
109104. 
Resilience is a sort of nirvana. There exists no organisational type that  
our embracing of the myth of Nature Resilient will strengthen; there is no 
position that  we could take up within the process of social life that  would lead 
us to bias our culture towards the idea of a resilient nature. There is no resi- 
lient direction; there is no bias towards resilience. Just a s  nirvana is escape 
from the wheel of suffering so resilience is escape from the coils of cultural 
bias. Resilience does not map onto the plural rationality framework; i t  is, 
rather, the consequence-the deep implication--of that framework. 
Now that the myths of nature have been satisfactorily mapped onto the 
ideas of nature we should ask ourselves two questions. First. what are the 
consequences and capabilities of the increase in self-knowledge that  this syn- 
thesis confers (assuming that  is, that the ecological and cultural hypotheses 
are valid)? Second, what are  the implications of all this for the re-conception 
of policy? 
The answer to the first question is that we have now established (on a 
sound and broad the.oretica1 base) a transcendental level (characterised by 
such notions as resilience, plural rationalities, political cultures, and con- 
strained relativism) that  simply was not there before. The answer to the 
second question is that, as debates spill out of their narrow technical confines 
(and, given the eternal nature of political cultures, they often do and often 
will), we are now able (thanks to this conceptual frame that allows us confront 
contradiction without a t  the same time demanding its removal) to shift our 
focus to the wider democratic concern that permeates all of technological 
choice--how best to moderate specilk debates so as not to erode general con- 
sent. 
As we make this shift we rediscover an old truth-that that  which is inevit- 
ably transcendent a t  the  level of individual cognition is part and parcel of the 
everyday business of the institutions and constitutions that make up what we 
are accustomed to call government. The paradox is that  that  which is unat- 
tainable for the individual is inescapable for the mediating institutions of 
democracy. 
Though this whole exercise has been directed towards demonstrating that  
rationality is plural, yet there is a very real (but, so far as the individual is 
concerned, transcendent) sense in which its success can be seen as demon- 
strating the exact opposite-that rationality is unitary. 
There being really no duality, pluralism is untrue. 
Until duality is transcended an at-one-ment realised, 
Enlightenment cannot be attainedL 
*Zha libatan Gbok of Uro &eat Libatatiun, Edited by W.Y. Evans-Wentz, Word University Press 
1881 (reprint). p. 206. 
